Intra-EU Labour Mobility and the Welfare State 69 In a comparative study of 18 OECD countries, Soroka et al. (2006) explore the effect of changes in stocks of foreign-born on changes in social welfare spending. They find that welfare spending grows less in countries with increasing immigration than in countries with smaller changes in immigration. In contrast, Gaston and Rajaguru (2013) find no evidence to suggest a negative association between immigration and social spending. Instead, they show that depending on the sample of countries chosen, immigration can increase social welfare spending. This resonates with Fenwick (2019), who shows that the proportion of foreign-born is positively associated with social spending. In contrast, Römer (2023) finds a negative association between net migration and social spending in the short term. On the other hand, she also finds a positive association between net migration and the generosity of unemployment benefits and pensions, concluding that there is little evidence that migration is undermining the generosity of the welfare state. Moreover, Lipsmeyer and Zhu (2011) show that domestic political pressures play a larger role than immigration for explaining variation in unemployment benefits and that the impact of immigration is conditional on union density and/or left-party strength. However, this may not be the case for minimum income benefits. Taschwer (2021) finds that migration is negatively associated with minimum income benefit levels and that this association is not affected by partisan politics. In addition, the type of social protection programme – and whether it is contributory or non-contributory, targeted or universal – may also be relevant for assessing immigration’s impact on welfare state effort. Theoretically, different types of programmes are built on different principles, and these principles can influence the way individuals may respond to immigration and redistribution (Boeri, 2010; Muñoz & Pardos-Prado, 2017). Based on previous research, it is probable that any association with welfare state effort could be programme specific. Boeri (2010) finds that immigrants, on average, tend to rely more on non-contributory social policies, such as social assistance, than their native counterparts. Whereas he finds the opposite for contributory benefits, such as pensions, and notes that immigrants are less likely to receive sickness and unemployment benefits than natives. Boeri (2010) argues that this ‘residual dependency’ depends on the skill composition of migrants and that migrants with lower educational attainment are associated with a higher fiscal cost to the welfare state. As such, programmes that migrants are expected to more heavily rely on may be more likely to be targets for retrenchment or welfare chauvinism. Likewise, in the case of contributory benefits for example, the relationship between contributions paid and benefits received is clearer and thus potentially less controversial as immigrants have arguably paid for their own benefits (Eick & Larson, 2022). However, as contributory benefits are based on prior contributions, this also makes them more vulnerable to welfare chauvinism as individuals are easier to exclude through measures such as a minimum number of years of contributions required.
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