122 Chapter 6 This chapter builds on Chapter 2 by narrowing the scope to focus on intraEU labour mobility and by disaggregating welfare state effort further. Specifically, it distinguishes between Western European (WE) labour mobility and Central and Eastern European (CEE) labour mobility, two previously unmeasured categories of movement, in order to ask do these two groups of labour migrants have differing effects on welfare state effort? Furthermore, welfare state spending is disaggregated into five component parts (old age, incapacity, family, active labour market policies, and unemployment spending) and complemented with two replacement rates (unemployment and social assistance). The study is a cross-comparative analysis of 16 European countries, and results show that CEE labour mobility is positively and significantly associated with the social benefit subdomains of incapacity, family, and unemployment spending. For WE labour migrants, we do not find any significant results except for family spending, but this is only at the 10 percent level of significance. For other immigrants, measured as the foreignborn population, we find positive and significant results across almost all spending categories. Furthermore, labour migrants from CEE member states are positively and significantly associated with the unemployment replacement rate and the social assistance replacement rate. In contrast, there is no statistically significant effect of WE labour migrants on either the unemployment replacement rate or the social assistance replacement rate, and foreign-born is only positively and significantly associated with social assistance replacement rates. When we consider programme design, such as whether a benefit is contributory or non-contributory/targeted or universal, we do not find any patterns that would provide clear evidence that that is an important contributory factor. However, it may be that other dimensions of generosity are more likely to be affected (such as access) in light of increasing immigration and were these aspects to be under study, then the conclusions drawn may differ. Moreover, there may be multiple mechanisms at work. For example, a universal programme may be more at risk of retrenchment because of the fiscal pressure that more beneficiaries cause, but equally it may have a larger support base in order to protect it from cuts because ultimately anyone can be a beneficiary. Several studies show that public attitudes toward immigration depend on criteria such as perceptions of economic and cultural compatibility (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014), which may explain why CEE migrants (often lower wage) drive compensatory welfare increases, whereas Western European migrants (potentially seen as more economically similar) do not. In addition, as we find increases in replacement rates and not just social spending, migration flows may not just increase total spending but reshape welfare priorities. Finally, our findings of a compensatory effect considering increasing mobility across the EU, complement the evidence presented in Chapter 2. This Chapter shows that the type of movement and the type of social protection programme is important for better understanding how immigration reshapes the boundaries of the welfare state.
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