Intra-EU Labour Migration and Attitudes Towards the Welfare State 115 suggested. It may be that other factors, such as economic conditions and the level of generosity of social policies, might be more important for determining these perceptions. On the other hand, CEE labour mobility has a positive and significant association with subjective poverty risk. This finding aligns with the hypothesis that CEE labour mobility might exacerbate concerns about wealth and poverty, reflecting concerns regarding greater competition for economic resources aligning with Dustmann et al. (2010), who found that specific types of migration could heighten concerns about poverty and economic resources. However, there is no effect for foreign-born on subjective poverty risk. Finally, neither indicator for immigration is associated with a greater likelihood of voting to leave the EU, which suggests that other factors, such as broader political sentiments and economic conditions, might play a more critical role in shaping EU exit preferences and that migration alone and immigration may not be as decisive a factor in Eurosceptic attitudes as previously thought. This resonates with Colantone and Stanig (2018) who also find no association between immigration and support for Leave but instead show that the vote for Leave was higher in regions hit harder by economic globalisation and driven by the general economic situation of their region and absence of effective compensation. Next, in Table 5.5 the dependent variable is the degree to which an individual expresses job insecurity (the first assumption in the compensation hypothesis) and I use the same explanatory variables as in the main analysis in order to explore which micro-level factors are important for predicting job insecurity. Model 12 presents an ordered logit model with support for redistribution as the dependent variable and Models 13-16, using the same sample as Model 12 for ease of comparison, all show logit models with subjective job insecurity as the dependent variable. There are some key differences between the two dependent variables, such as those who are younger are more likely to express greater levels of job insecurity than those who are older, whereas age is not such a crucial factor for determining preferences for redistribution. This is unsurprising, as often levels of youth unemployment are double that of the general population. Moreover, while being foreign-born has no influence on whether your likelihood of agreeing with the statement on redistribution, it is an important predictor of whether or not someone is likely to express job insecurity. Again, this is reflected in the fact that the foreign-born population usually have higher rates of unemployment than the native-born. Furthermore, in Model 16 the analysis shows that general levels of immigration, as measured by foreign-born as a percentage of the population, have a positive and significant association with job insecurity. When levels of foreign-born are higher, individuals are more likely to express feelings of job insecurity. In Table 5.5, the analysis finds that general levels of immigration, as measured by foreign-born as a percentage of the
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