Thesis

55 Chapter 3 variates in further analyses (Chi2 liking = 9.29, p = .678; Chi 2 prohibiting = 6.20, p = .906. Finally, we measured demographics (sex, age, and education level)v. Results. Similar to Experiment 1, a one-way ANOVA shows no direct effect of message frame on impulse buying urge (F (2, 521) = 1.70, p = .185). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is rejected again. However, in line with the results of Experiment 1, we do find a mediation effect of moral justification (H3) when performing mediation analysis. Please note that Hayes (2018) argues that the direct effect of X on Y is not required in modern mediation analysis. Mediation analysis (with Process Model 4) shows that the message frame influences moral justification. Participants exposed to the other-benefit advertisement experienced higher levels of moral justification than participants who were exposed to the self-benefit or neutral advertisement (Mself = 4, SD = 1.56; Mneutral = 4.10, SD = 1.59; Mother = 5.03, SD = 1.55; B = -.567, SE = .14, 95% CI: [-.86 to -.28]). The analysis also shows that moral justification affects impulse buying urge (B = .291, SE = .04, 95% CI: [.22 to .36]). Subsequently, the results demonstrate a mediating effect of message frames on impulse buying urges through moral justification (b = .65, SE = .13, 95% CI: [.41 to .91]), meaning that an other-benefit frame positively affects impulse buying urges through moral justification. Message framing does not affect impulse buying urges through deservingness justification (b = -.15, SE = .13, 95% CI: [-.14 to .40]). Experiment 2 also reveals a direct positive effect of message frame on impulsive buying behavior. People who were exposed to an other-benefit frame chose to buy the cookies more often (15.8%; with points they earned by participating in this study) than those who were exposed to the self-benefit frame (3.9%, Chi2 = 19.76, f2 = .17, p < .001). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is accepted. Among the people who were exposed to the neutral condition, 9.9% chose to buy the cookies impulsively. This percentage does not differ significantly from the other-benefit frame (p = .150) or the self-benefit frame (p = .132). Again, Process Model 4 shows that moral justification functions as a mediator in the effect of message frame on impulse buying (b = .46, SE = .15, 95% CI: [.21 to .80]), and deservingness justification does not function as a mediator in this effect (b = 05, SE = .06, 95% CI: [-.06 to .17]). Thus, the effect of the message frame on impulse buying is explained only by moral justification. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is also accepted. To substantiate that people were morally justified to impulsively buy the cookies (and not bought impulsively, for example, for purely altruistic reasons), we additionally asked them about who they wanted to benefit from by buying the cookies (themselves versus others). In all the three conditions, thus also in the other-benefit message condition, people admitted that they (at least partially) wanted to buy the cookies for selfish reasons (Mneutral = 3.05, SD = 1.56, Mself = 2.78, SD = 1.66; Mother = 4.64, SD = 1.87). Discussion. Experiment 2 shows that message frames have an indirect effect on impulse buying urges through moral justification (H3). Additionally, it shows a direct effect of message framing on impulse buying behavior, as hypothesized in H2. This direct effect is partially explained or mediated by moral justification (H3). Based on the results, it can be concluded that people seem to adopt reasons to

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