258 Addendum For objective claims, ‘truth’ is the criterion to judge the validity of claims. For social claims, that is ‘justice’. That identity is subjectively understood as someone’s self-understanding does not mean that the subjective claims associated with that self-understanding are also automatically valid. One could be mistaken in his or her self-understanding, or at least develop a more refined self-understanding. I refer to the criterion for the validity of subjective claims as ‘authenticity’. The formulation ‘what someone experiences as essential to who he or she is’ is perhaps the most general interpretation I use for someone’s ‘identity’. It’s a mouthful, so sometimes I’ll stick to ‘what’s essential to someone’, or simply ‘who they are’. ‘Self-understanding’ can be considered as a synonym of ‘identity’ in this thesis. What someone experiences as essential to him or her has practical meaning: he or she wants to express and realize what is essential to him or her. In other words, one’s selfunderstanding consists of commitments. If someone has a commitment, it means that someone has the will to fulfill the intention expressed in the commitment, in other words to generate the necessary actions and avoid tempting oneself not to fulfill the commitment. When someone tries to realize his or her commitments, there is ‘self-expression’. This also means that a change in commitments constitutes a change of identity, and therefore of self-understanding. People have multiple commitments. Some are relatively unrelated (such as a commitment to family well-being and a commitment to meeting work obligations), others are strongly interrelated (such as a commitment to meeting appointments and a commitment to achieving certain results). Commitments are directly or indirectly linked. One’s identity can therefore be understood as a network of (essential) commitments. When someone is aware of some commitments, he or she then has an articulated understanding of these commitments. Often a refined, more precise articulation is possible and some commitments that are present are still completely unarticulated. Question for the thesis: stable and just solutions An identity-related moral conflict (IRMC) is resolved when the parties to the conflict no longer hinder each other’s self-expression. This means that parties can freely try to realize their (essential) commitments. This means that although new conflicts may arise over time, the same conflict will not flare up again. If this is fulfilled, then there is a ‘stable’ solution. A theory that distinguishes a stable solution does not do so in retrospect, but looking forward. A solution is stable if, viewed from the perspective of a person’s own goals, it is rational to act in accordance with the relevant solution proposal, in all conceivable circumstances. In an IRMC, it is not just interests that can be maximized that are at stake, but commitments that are essential for both parties. If that would be possible only in specific circumstances, the solution would not be stable. As soon as circumstances change, it could be rational to deviate from that solution proposal. The conflict could flare up again. When testing the solution proposals of various theories, I will therefore analyze whether there are foreseeable circumstances in which it is rational for the parties to opt for an action option other than that of the solution proposal.
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